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The crime of conspiracy is the creation of the common law and is peculiar to 
it. Its essence consists of an agreement between two or more persons to do an 
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. In Canada, this common law 
crime has been codified in s. 423 (2) as follows: 
"(2) Every one who conspires with any one 
(a) to effect an unlawful purpose, or 
(b) to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means, is guilty of an 
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years."1 
The offence is complete as soon as the agreement is made. This is so because 
the law recognizes that once people go so far as to agree to act unlawfully there 
is a serious risk that they will carry out their agreement. The agreement is in 
itself made an offence in order to preserve the Queen's peace by preventing the 
offence which the conspirators have agreed to perpetrate before it reaches even 
the stage of an attempt. This has been the basis of the law of conspiracy since the 
earliest times. In 1610 an English Court commented upon the usefulness of such 
charges. 
". . . the usual commission of oyer and terminer gives power to the com-
missioners to enquire, &c. de omnibus coadunat ionibus , 
confoederationibus, et falsis alligantiis . . . in these cases before the 
unlawful act executed the law punishes the coadunation, confederacy or 
false alliance, to the end to prevent the unlawful act . . . and in these cases 
the common law is a law of mercy, for it prevents the malignant from 
doing mischief, and the innocent from suffering it."2 
A party to a conspiracy must intend to participate in the common purpose 
with a view to achieving its objective. For the most part, in order to establish or 
prove the offence of conspiracy, the agreement is proven by the fact that certain 
overt acts took place. That may not always be necessary in order to prove the 
offence of conspiracy today. Sophisticated electronic surveillance devices make 
proof of the agreement no longer dependent upon the establishment of sub-
sequent confirming acts. Evidence by way of tape recordings may be sufficient 
proof to establish the agreement without any reference to subsequent activities. 
There is a further question of who is implicated as a co-conspirator and what 
evidence is required in order to establish such implication. The Attorney 
General in arguing the case of R v. Stone in England said: 
". . . as the overt act charged was conspiracy of which proof was before the 
Court, the act of each conspirator in the prosecution of such conspiracy 
was evidence against all."3 
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This is so even if the conspirators are not in direct communication with each 
other and the agreement is made over a period of time and the conspirators are 
geographically dispersed. Further, it was more recently established in the 
English House of Lords in the case of D.P.P. v. Doot et al that: 
"An agreement made outside the jurisdiction of the English Courts to 
commit an unlawful act within the jurisdiction was a conspiracy which 
could be tried in England, if the agreement was subsequently performed, 
wholly or in part, in England."4 
In order to constitute the offence it is only necessary to establish that the 
agreement involved was to effect an "unlawful purpose", not necessarily an 
"illegal purpose", thereby making it arguable that the unlawful purpose may be 
beyond that prohibited by a federal, provincial or municipal enactment. The 
ambit of such a power may create certain mischief, as "illegal" and "unlawful" 
are not viewed by the Courts as synonymous. 
It was in the famous case of Shaw v. DP.P.' that this extended use of the 
criminal conspiracy offence was taken to mean more than "illegal purpose" to 
distinguish "unlawful purpose" as quite a different type of activity. "Unlawful" 
seemed, in this case, to be equated with what the Court judged to be wrongful 
and yet not necessarily illegal. The House of Lords in Shaw recognized 
conspiracy to corrupt public morals, an offence unknown to the law. 
In Shaw the accused published a booklet which advertised the names, 
addresses, photographs and specialties of prostitutes, who paid for the advertise-
ments. He was charged that he had conspired with the advertisers and other 
persons by means of the "ladies directory" to debauch and corrupt the morals of 
youth and other subjects of the Queen. The accused was convicted of a 
conspiracy to commit a wrongful act calculated to cause public injury. The act 
itself was not illegal but rather seen by the Court as wicked, or wrongful and, as 
such, deserving of punishment. The concept runs directly contrary to the prin-
ciples of criminal law which assert that before a man can be convicted of a 
criminal offence he must be proven to have offended against a specific offence 
and proof of that must be established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The argument goes, how else is a man to protect himself if the Court can 
create a new wrong quite outside the known criminal law provisions. None-
theless, the decision in Shaw has been followed by subsequent cases.6 
Thus, the concept of common law conspiracy goes beyond the law's reluc-
tance to limit the application of criminal law to precise acts of commission but 
rather raises instead a broad and ill-defined net with which to snare those who 
agree together to commit activities that a Court is prepared to rule are unlaw-
ful. The obvious danger with this approach is that a Court may place a rather 
arbitrary definition upon what constitutes unlawfulness for the purpose of a 
conviction of common law conspiracy. Lord Diplock has warned that common 
law conspiracy should not be used to create new offences not previously recog-
nized by the criminal law.7 The Courts generally have not supported such a 
limitation." 
If one keeps in mind the ambit of the offence of common law criminal 
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conspiracy, one can imagine its wide-ranging application and potential when it 
comes to controlling political crime, disorder and terrorist activities, otherwise 
ill-defined by law. It has been said of the offence that: 
"Vague in definition and unpredictable in application, the offence is 
uniquely adaptable to the turmoil of what is, or what is perceived to be, a 
threat to existing order or stability. When such a threat . . . real or 
imagined . . . is recognized, it is usually seen as arising from the pre-
concert of several persons. The ingredients of conspiracy are readily 
inferred and it remains only to find an appropriate label by which it may 
be characterized as unlawful. Sedition and treason are the principal 
political conspiracies, though the open-mindedness of common law 
conspiracy suggests endless possibilities in rendering a combination 
unlawful."9 
In times of political crisis or turmoil, social and political values are in direct 
conflict and those wielding state and judicial power are in a position to define 
acts of confrontation and dissent as unlawful if they are perceived as directly 
threatening political and social stability. In this sense crisis creates law and the 
offence of criminal conspiracy constitutes its catalyst. 
A conspiratorial theory applied to what are seen as the seeds of political 
disorder is natural to those concerned and in power. Criminal conspiracy is seen 
as a useful tool to strike swiftly at those viewed as co-conspirators in an attempt 
to isolate them from potential mass support. Conspiracy charges pre-empt 
further disruptive developments and subjects those charged to the control of the 
Courts at the earliest possible stage of a potential disruption. 
A charge of conspiracy to commit sedition or treason is so broadly based that 
it provides a useful legal construct aimed at early containment. A conspiracy to 
commit sedition, for example, is founded upon an agreement between two or 
more persons to carry out a seditious intent as set out in s. 60 of the Criminal 
Code. 
"60 (I) Seditious words are words that express a seditious intention. 
(2) A seditious libel is a libel that expresses a seditious intention; 
(3) A seditious conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons 
to carry out a seditious intention; 
(4) Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the expression 
'seditious intention', every one shall be presumed to have a seditious 
intention who 
(a) teaches or advocates, or 
(b) publishes or circulates any writing that advocates, the use, 
without the authority of law, of force as a means of accomplish-
ing a governmental change within Canada. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 
60".10 
One of the most notorious applications of the vague definition of sedition 
combined with the open ended possibilities of the conspiracy offence took place 
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during the Winnipeg general strike. Many of those in power felt, as did the 
Manitoba Free Press at the time, that the strike was the result of a conspiracy of 
communist elements and the first stage of an imported Bolshevik revolution 
planned for the prairies. The developments surrounding the strike have been well 
documented elsewhere." It was clear there was near hysteria in the reaction of 
press and government to what was seen as a real threat to Canadian social and 
political values. 
Eight men were charged with seditious conspiracy and seven were convicted of 
the offence. The law was used to limit threatening activities so that the Courts 
could immediately exert judicial control over all those alleged to be co-conspir-
ators. The evidence of one conspirator can be used against all the others 
charged. Similar proceedings were taken in 1931 against eight leaders of the 
Communist Party of Canada. 
At about the same time, charges were laid against the Sons of Freedom Sect 
of the Doukhobors. As late as the 1950's and 60's charges of seditious 
conspiracy were laid against some of the Doukhobor sects' leadership. Twenty 
Doukhobors were convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and others of the 
sect were charged with conspiracy to intimidate the Parliament of Canada and 
the British Columbia legislature. 
During the Quebec crisis, in the fall of 1970, five men were charged that they 
had conspired to advocate violence contrary to s. 62 (c) of the Criminal Code. 
The proof of an agreement to advocate violence is sufficient to establish such an 
offence even if violence never occurred and there was no evidence of the 
accuseds' participation. Mr. Justice Ouimet granted a defence motion to quash 
the charge on the basis that it was too vague. The problem with this particular 
charge was that the unlawful activities took place over a lengthy period of time 
and the particulars relating to the nature of the agreement were not available. 
On the other hand, Vallieres, Larue-Langlois and Gagnon, were successfully 
charged with seditious conspiracy to overthrow the government by force or 
threats of force but were acquitted on these charges after a lengthy trial. 
Criminal conspiracy charges have been used in times of social unrest as 
anticipatory self-defence on the part of government authorities who feel there is 
a real danger threatening institutional and social stability. However, the open-
ended nature of the offence of common law conspiracy may inhibit the Courts 
from convicting those charged with the offence unless allegations are specific 
and the evidence persuasive. Nonetheless, the development of the law in this 
area will encourage authorities to use criminal conspiracy charges as a social 
defence provided by law in an attempt to contain political unrest before it 
escalates into violent confrontation. 
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Introduction 
Revolutions in plural societies are inevitably affected by the domestic 
configuration and dynamics of communal relations. Thus in the Russian Revol-
ution, the "national question" influenced Bolshevik strategy before and after the 
overthrow of the Czarist regime: in China, regional and ethnic-related 
proclivities have historically made it difficult for both revolutionary movements 
and incumbents to mobilize national political power. In a large number of 
emergent states where revolution occurred in the form of a protracted internal 
war, insurgents were variously helped and frustrated by tensions and divisions 
between ethnic groups coexistent within the revolutionary arena. Similar 
dynamics were involved in the majority of contemporary colonialist revolutions. 
Generally, these transfers of power were preceded by a period during which an 
imperial force held sway by employing the well-known strategy of "divide and 
rule"; what independence movements had primarily to achieve before they could 
effectively confront the colonial power was the construction of an alliance 
between those ethnic groups which had been politically divided. 
These dialectics of revolution in communally plural societies are naturally 
complex; also, they may be mainly case-specific. However, from the vantage of 
counterrevolutionary strategy, the central task is nearly always to prevent the 
forces of revolution from securing and coordinating a substantial inter-ethnic 
opposition to the incumbent. Traditionally, two techniques have been used in 
this regard. One has involved the purposeful application of reform to develop a 
common base of interests on the part of an incumbent elite and the vanguards of 
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